July 1950
Combat Operations Taegu, South Korea
Front Line Meeting. Lt. General WaIton H. Walker (left), Commanding General of the Eighth Army and Major General Earle E. Partridge, Commanding General of the Fifth Air Force, meet “somewhere in Korea” on July 16, 1950, to “discuss strategy prior to their take-off to inspect front line fighting.
Pilots arriving at K-2, Taegu saw a few widely dispersed F-51s (with South Korean markings), one adobe building, and an awning-like affair over a low stack of packing boxes (that housed the “maintenance hangar”).
In the distance to the north, up a steep hill, were a few one-man Pup tents.
The nerve center of the squadron—the Operations Office—was one small room of the adobe hut, “with a local area chart thumb-tacked to one wall, two or three wooden ammo boxes and a hand-crank field telephone,” Biteman said.
Taegu airfield, in mid-July, 1950, was simply an open, dusty patch of pastureland approximately not quite a mile in length, about four miles north of Taegu City. The so-called “runway” ran east and west, and was little more than a dusty road with numerous pot holes and dips.
The “Front,” was moving south so fast that it was impossible to identify any specific area as being in friendly or enemy hands.
Taejon Falls
The dangers of using B-29s for close air support were tragically emphasized on July 17th when three B-29s accidentally bombed friendly civilians in Andong, South Korea.
On Thursday, July 20th, despite FEAF close air support, the North Korean Army took Taejon, forcing the remnants of the US 24th Infantry Division to withdraw to the southeast. U.S. ground forces defending Taejon had suffered almost thirty percent casualties in just one week of brutal fighting.
Maj. Gen. Otto P. Weyland, USAF, arrived in the Far East to assume the position of FEAF Vice Commander for Operations.
Fifth Air Force pilots in F-80s shot down two more enemy aircraft, the last aerial victories until November. Enemy air opposition had virtually disappeared, a sign that FAF was achieving its goal of air superiority.
The city of Taejon fell to the Communists the same day that Typhoon Gloria’s low ceilings caused the few airplanes of the Dallas Squadron to stand down. Hundreds of UN troops were captured, including Major General Dean.
“I don’t know how much difference our efforts would have made,” Biteman noted, “had we been able to fly that one day. Although he acknowledged, “we couldn’t stop the advance,” perhaps if air cover had been available “we could have allowed our troops a little more of a fighting chance to regroup.”
For the Dallas Squadron, “it was a very sad, frustrating feeling. If only there were more of us, and if we had more planes ...or more hours in each day ...if, if, if....!”
Taejon’s capture marked a major success for the North Korean’s western forces. It made it possible, Biteman explained, for them to effect a risky end-around advance along the weakly-defended western and southern coasts of the peninsula and, at the same time, continue their steady advance down the east coast with their third force.
The Dallas Squadron became directly involved with the end-around flanking movement on the west coast, but because of inadequate communications—as well as “too few airplanes to cover too much war, we failed to slow the Communist advance as we should have.