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Combat Action Summary

July 1950

Bout One Squadron

A week after the Korean War began, the Air Force was rapidly shifting from caught off guard defense to increasingly aggressive offense in its efforts to hurt the North Korean supply train and combat units enough to halt their advance and then cause them retreat behind their previous border.

The limited use of jet aircraft, in particular the F-80 “Shooting Star,” had given them enough data to make long range decisions that would affect many units and thousands of airmen for the next 2 ½ years of combat. Not only could the fuel-sucking Shooting Stars not stay on station for very long, there were no runways in Korea that could handle their requirements for length and surfacing. The heavily loaded transport aircraft had already begun chewing up the lightly surfaced runways in Korea.

It was clear that all of the jets, for the time being, would have to be based in Japan. This, of course, reduced their combat effectiveness significantly.

It was also clear to FEAF planners that they would need to use every possible conventional F-51 that could be secured. The jets were performing adequately but the Mustangs had far greater range, could loiter over targets for hours and could use shorter and rougher runways. [Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force In Korea: 1950-1953. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, USAF, 1983. p. 68.}

Thirty Mustangs were rustled up from storage locations scattered around the FEAF area of operations. Plans were immediately drawn up to use these weary war birds to equip a provisional fighter squadron that could operate from Japan until suitable facilities could be found and prepared in Korea.

Lt. Gen. Earle Partridge and Major Gen. Edward J. Timberlake agreed that they needed to operate as many conventional F-51 Mustangs—from Korean bases—as they could find and support. However, at the time, the only airfield that could be used without extensive repairs was located about five miles northeast of Taegu—a sod-and-gravel runway (full of pot holes), two dilapidated concrete buildings, and a wooden mess hall built by the Japanese during their Korean occupation.

“K-2” as it was soon called, was soon identified as the destination of “Bout-One,” a pick-up or composite squadron organized by the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing on June 27 that included both U.S. and Korean pilots.

Korea Requests Mustangs

At the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, South Korea’s President Syngman Rhee had asked President Truman for an immediate show of airpower by the South Koreans to discourage the North Korean troops, Lt. Col. (then 1st Lt.) Duane “Bud” Biteman explained.

On July 1st, 1950, President Truman authorized the transfer of ten airplanes. All of the fighter units in the Far East had already converted to the F-80 “Shooting Star” jets many months before. The only F-51s that were not mothballed and in storage were a few decrepit derelicts that were towing targets for aerial gunnery practice. All were stripped, dirty and “tired,” but they were the only F-51’s in the Far East available for immediate use.

[Biteman was an original member of the “Dallas Squadron,” another composite unit from the 18th Group that was soon en route to Korea.  Bud would eventually found and serve as President of the 18th Fighter Wing Association.]

The “Bout One” Mustangs were ferried to Taegu by members of the 35th Fighter Group. On their way to Korea, they were asked to fly top cover for General MacArthur’s C-54--“Bataan”--en route to Suwon, where he was to confer with General Dean and look over the battle situation.

“They chose the old derelict F-51s over the newer, faster F-80 jets,” Biteman explained, “because the old Mustangs had enough fuel to circle the field the entire time MacArthur was on the ground conferring, then escort him all the way back to Pusan, and still had enough fuel to return for their original intended landing at Taegu!”

The U.S. air advisors were not at all convinced that the young Korean pilots could handle the ten Mustangs they had been provided.

To provide more depth and on-scene training, Major Dean E. Hess and nine U.S. Instructor pilots had been assigned to the unit, which moved to Taegu on the evening of June 30th and reported into the local KMAG Commander.

Major Dean “Preacher” Hess talks with two American pilots flying Korean marked F-51’s from K-2 in August 1950.
Major Dean “Preacher” Hess talks with two American pilots flying Korean marked F-51’s from K-2 in August 1950.

At first, the Korean pilots were allowed to fly missions together with their American pilot colleagues. However, with the crash and death of the ROK commander, it was apparent that their long absence from the cockpits of the heavy, “tricky” F-51s required that the American pilots fly all the missions.

Upon arriving at Taegu, the “Bout One” commander, Major Dean Hess, and his crew, tried to teach the inexperienced South Korean pilots how to fly the high performance Mustangs from the rough, “cow pasture” runway at Taegu, Biteman explained.

Trying to upgrade the Korean pilots from a 650-hp T-6 trainer to a 1350-hp fighter while flying combat missions against the enemy was an impossible situation.”

Soon enough, the “Bout One” pilots just left the Korean pilots on the ground at Taegu to refuel and re-arm the airplanes, and started flying the combat missions themselves,” Biteman said.

At first Bout One pilots were assigned missions directly by KMAG. The “system” was very informal.

On one occasion, “individuals came out from KMAG in the middle of the night, about three o’clock in the morning, and they requested an air strike verbally just by sticking their heads in the tent and asking for an air strike over a city at a certain time. Then they disappeared into the night,” Hess remembered.

The Bout One pilots gave a good account of themselves and could stay over enemy lines for hours, searching out targets when none were reported by the Army. [Futrell. p. 90.] 

Within a few days, as the “Dallas Project” pilots began arriving with no airplanes of their own, Headquarters FEAF decided to assign to them the nine remaining flyable F-51s—complete with South Korean insignia painted on the wings and fuselage. When more F-51s became available, Dean Hess moved to Masan, on the southern coast, and started a pilot training school for the South Korean pilots.

[Major Dean Hess later wrote a book of his Korean experiences, which was made into the movie “Battle Hymn,” starring Rock Hudson.]

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